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The Effect of Prison Gang Membership on Recidivism 
 
 
Brendan Dooley, Alan Seals, and David Skarbek 
 
 
Purpose: How does prison gang membership affect recidivism? In this paper, we 
use a unique dataset of all releasees from prisons operated by the Illinois 
Department of Corrections during the month of November 2000, which includes 
demographic information and data on gang participation. We attempt to control 
for confounding factors that are traditionally associated with both prison gang 
membership and rearrest. 
 
Methods: We develop a potential-outcomes framework and describe the 
conditions under which a counterfactual can be estimated when gang membership 
is not randomly assigned.  We combine regression analysis with Coarsened Exact 
Matching, which has several advantages over the more popular propensity score 
matching, to estimate the effect of gang membership on recidivism.   
 
Results: Prison gang membership results in a six percentage point increase in 
recidivism.  
 
Conclusions: Despite the strengths of the data, unobserved heterogeneity among 
inmates could still bias estimates. However, there are probably important 
subtleties to the gang participation decision such that experimental or quasi-
experimental data are unlikely to increase our understanding of the relationship 
between gang-membership and post-release outcomes. We recommend 
incorporating ethnography with survey data collection, because ethnographers are 
able to document otherwise unobservable contextual information concerning the 
selection process which could be used to identify causal relationships. 
 








How does prison gang membership affect recidivism? There are many reasons to assume 
that it increases the potential for reoffending relative to releasees who lack a connection to a 
criminal organization. Although there has been an increasing amount of research dedicated to 
examining the correlates of recidivism, relatively little has been devoted to the role of prison 
gang membership specifically. There are two primary obstacles to answering this question. First, 
the lack of data is a practical problem. Second, there is an important methodological challenge 
about how to effectively control for potential confounders in establishing a causal relationship 
between gang membership and post-release outcome.  
Gang members likely have many attributes, both observed and unobserved, which are 
correlated with gang membership and also predict persistent criminal behavior.  The researcher 
has to account for selection bias because other factors influence both gang membership and 
recidivism.  If these covariates are not controlled for, then they will bias our measure of the 
affect of prison gangs on recidivism. In theory, an experimental design that randomly assigned 
offenders into treatment (prison gang affiliated) and control groups (non-gang affiliated) would 
eliminate the confounding influence. A practical alternative is to use a multivariate regression 
framework with observational data and control for potentially confounding criminogenic 
attributes.  However, causal interpretation of regression coefficients requires strict, and often 
unrealistic, assumptions concerning the relationship between unobservables and the gang 
participation decision.  Standard regression analysis focuses attention on the estimated outcomes 
rather than on the selection mechanism, which is often of more interest to the researcher.  
Additionally, regression is a purely parametric approach and requires assumptions concerning 
the distributions of the covariates which may not reflect actual sample properties.  For example, 
randomized trials, in an ideal setting, match all other relevant characteristics of sample units and 
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then randomly apply a “treatment” to some portion of the sample. Hence, a controlled 
experiment would balance the covariate distributions across treatment and control units, allowing 
the researcher to isolate the independent affect of prison gang membership. A regression 
analysis, on the other hand, will often have covariate values outside the area of common support 
thus creating estimates which depend more on the specific assumptions associated with the 
estimator than the characteristics of the data.        
In this paper, we examine 2,534 releasees from Illinois prisons in November of 2000 who 
were tracked for a period of two years after release.  These data address the practical limitation 
of finding records on prison gang membership collected by prison authorities who are reluctant 
to dispense information on “security threat groups.”  Using a potential outcomes framework, we 
first address the underlying assumptions necessary to identify the average treatment effect of 
prison gang membership on recidivism (see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).1  This is an 
important step because it allows us to think more clearly about the selection mechanism of gang 
membership without placing the problem in the context of a specific statistical model.  In 
addition, it also points to what types of information future qualitative criminological research, 
particularly ethnography, could provide to guide model selection.  We apply Coarsened Exact 
Matching (Iacus, King, & Porro 2011), a matching algorithm which has several statistical 
advantages over other popular matching techniques such as propensity score matching, to the 
sample of post releases.   We find that prison gang membership results in a six percentage point 






Review of existing literature 
The reintegration question has drawn a great deal of attention from criminology and 
criminal justice (Petersilia 2003). Each year more than 675,000 prisoners are released (West et 
al., 2010). Prison beds cost state governments an average of $22,500 annually (Stephan, 2004). 
Finding ways of reducing the expenditures associated with recidivism would be welcome fiscal 
news (Baumer, 1997). The rebirth of the rehabilitative correctional philosophy offers insights 
into how this might be accomplished. Aiming services at high-risk offenders is one solution that 
has demonstrated promise (Gendreau et al., 1996). This leads to the issue that guides nearly all of 
criminal justice, classifying and managing risk.  
The first step in the process involves locating that group of offenders who face an 
elevated risk of reoffending. Identifying a characteristic that captures a combination of risk 
factors would improve the effectiveness of classification and risk management. Alternatively, if a 
unique identifier, one uncorrelated with others, could be located this could help correctional 
authorities and service providers focus their efforts more effectively by reducing the potential for 
fruitless supervision and services. In the first scenario, this would involve directing resources at 
programs that address broad issues such as improving employment prospects or reducing 
substance abuse problems. The second involves the more focused project of finding ways to 
attenuate the causal factor itself in the hopes of reducing recidivism. 
Despite the outward appearance that gang affiliation is the source of the reoffending 
problem, it might be that other factors determine both gang membership and reoffending. This 
poses a problem for how to allocate resources.  For example, offenders may have more 
opportunities to reoffend once they join a prison gang.  Street gang members often maintain ties 
to their organizations or create new alliances while serving prison sentences. Past work suggests 
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that their commitment to the gang identity is likely to gain strength while incarcerated (Moore, 
1978) which might have a bearing on behavior post-release (Moore, 1996). Another 
complicating factor is in differentiating those inmates with street gang connections (Varano et 
al., 2011) from those who only have a prison gang affiliation. Separating these complicated and 
intertwined issues will be instrumental in terms of generating more effective post-release 
supervision and service strategies. 
Criminology has typically approached the issue of gang membership and recidivism in 
two parallel literatures that both indirectly address the topic: recidivism in general and the factors 
that influence the choice to join gangs. We merge the two literatures through a comparison of 
inmates who the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) identified as prison gang members 
and non-members. A reading of the two literatures suggests that the independent effect of gang 
membership increases reoffending post-release. We will motivate this hypothesis in two stages 
and follow it with an empirical foundation in the remainder of the work. First, we survey the 
research that examines factors affecting the risk of ex-offender recidivism in general. This 
literature gives an account of the characteristics that are correlated with post-release success and 
failure.   
The second related literature provides theoretical explanations about why gang identified 
inmates are at an increased risk of reoffending. Here we offer possible explanations for why gang 
members are less likely to stop offending. Canvassing the street gang and prison gang literature 
lends credibility to the argument that there are numerous reasons to suspect that gang 




There have been several major efforts to determine what factors influence recidivism on 
both the national level and within the state of Illinois. Regarding the former, there have been two 
studies of recidivism drawing on large, nationally representative samples. The first measured 
recidivism as rearrest and reconviction with return to prison, the two most common measures 
found in the literature. Within three years, 63 percent of releasees were rearrested for a felony or 
serious misdemeanor and 41 percent were recommitted to prison during the same period (Beck 
and Shipley, 1989). Survival analysis revealed that achieving success during the first year of 
release is critical, as two-thirds of the rearrests occurred within the first year. Younger, minority, 
male, high school dropouts, who committed property offenses, and those who had more 
extensive arrest histories were more prone to recidivism (ibid). 
Subsequent research, also conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Langan and 
Levin, 2002), using the same definition and measure of recidivism found an increase in the 
overall level of recidivism. The rearrest rate and reincarceration rates increased to 68 percent and 
63 percent. The former is relatively slight in comparison to the marked boost in the 
recommitment rate, suggesting the correctional system had become more risk averse. The 
analysis reaffirmed a few of the findings of the earlier study in terms of the correlates evident in 
the recidivism patterns. Rearrest rates were significantly curtailed following the first year of 
release and the association between age, gender, race, conviction for a property offense and 
recidivism was consistent with the earlier study. 
These same general patterns were found in a series of studies conducted in Illinois in the 
1980s. Sixty percent of releasees followed for 27 to 29 months were rearrested (Illinois Criminal 
Justice Information Authority—ICJIA, 1986b) and 32 percent reincarcerated (ICJIA, 1985). The 
first nine months of release was dubbed the “critical period” for rearrests (ICJIA, 1986a). After 
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this period, the rearrest rate declines. Through survival analysis, the researchers predicted that 63 
percent of the sample was ultimately expected to be rearrested (ibid). Survival analysis also 
highlighted the effects of several factors. Younger releases, those convicted of a property 
offense, and those housed in maximum-security institutions experienced rearrest at a quicker 
pace than older, violent, and minimum security releasees. Age, race, marital status, prior 
incarceration, and prior arrests were all associated with rearrest. The report concludes that the 
factors that proved best in predicting rearrest were the number of prior arrests, prior state prison 
incarcerations and the holding offense classification (ICJIA, 1986b). 
How are these elements related to prison gang status? The same factors that are 
responsible for enhancing the chances of post-release rearrest or recommitment appear in greater 
proportions of gang members than non-affiliated inmates. Analysis of a cohort of prisoners 
confined in Nebraska found that gang members were younger, less likely to have a high school 
diploma, and less likely to be married or have children than their non-gang counterparts 
(Kreinert and Fleisher, 2001). Furthermore gang members had a more criminally involved past. 
For instance, gang members reported an earlier age of arrest, less education, less commitment to 
legal employment, more drug use and more prior arrests than non-gang members. Gang members 
also have a similar number of prior convictions when compared with non-gang members despite 
their being younger overall (ibid). Combining these results with the well substantiated findings 
about recidivism leads to the conclusion that gang members are likely to encounter rates of 
failure higher than those of their non-affiliated counterparts. A review of the gang literature 




Correctional officials often distinguish prison gangs from street gangs by the group’s 
location of origin. For example, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
(CDCR) define prison gangs as “any gang which originated and has its roots within the CDCR or 
any other custodial system” (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2011: 
381). As a matter of practice, prison gangs generally also require a lifetime membership, giving 
rise to the popular idea that the gang bond is “blood in, blood out.”2 One study finds that an 
average of only five percent of gang members drop out (Fong, Vogel, & Buentello, 1993). Prison 
gang members are typically more selective, secretive, criminally sophisticated, older, and violent 
than street gang members (Pyrooz et al., 2011: 4).3 
Location of origin provides a useful descriptive label, but both street and prison gangs 
often participate in similar criminal activities. Members of prison gangs and street gangs 
participate in illicit markets in correctional facilities, extort inmates, and disrupt operations (e.g. 
Jacobs, 1977; Camp & Camp, 1985). Many prison gangs, such as the Nuestra Familia and 
Mexican Mafia have expanded their operations outside of correctional facilities. Paroled prison 
gang members and associates conduct criminal activities on behalf of the prison gang 
organization. For powerful prison gangs like the Mexican Mafia, street gangs actually pay tribute 
to the gang in exchange for protection in jail and prison and the exclusive right to sell drugs in 
certain neighborhoods (Skarbek 2011).  
Membership in a prison gang is likely to increase recidivism in three ways: signaling a 
commitment to a criminal lifestyle, altering social and human capital, and invoking an 
institutional response. First, prison gang membership can provide a signal about the given and 
unobservable characteristics of a particular inmate. Because prison gangs require lifetime 
commitment, only those inmates who are most dedicated to a criminal lifestyle will agree to join. 
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Similarly, personal and journalistic accounts suggest that those inmates who perceive prison 
gang members to have the highest status in the criminal world will be most likely to seek 
membership (Blatchford, 2008). These two mechanisms connect prison gang membership with a 
higher likelihood of recidivism via a correlation with an unobserved criminal identity.4 These 
mechanisms would suggest that prison gang membership reveals underlying propensities to 
offend rather than making a person more likely to offend. 
A second way to explain the relationship between prison gang membership and 
reoffending is that, holding agent type constant, participating in a prison gang makes one more 
likely to recidivate. Several possible mechanisms exist. First, spending time with people who 
have longer criminal histories and offenses that are more serious increases one’s odds of 
recidivating (Chen and Shaprio, 2007; Bayer, Hjalmarsson, & Posen, 2009). Interaction with 
prison gang members leads to an increase in one’s knowledge of how to conduct criminal 
activity (Moore, 1996). A second mechanism that makes prison gangs membership lead to more 
recidivism is to expand or alter the inmate’s social network. Participating in a prison gang leads 
to new criminal opportunities once released because the inmate has new associates and is part of 
a more criminal social network. Alternatively, a prison gang member will be perceived to be 
more trustworthy because of his affiliation, and this trust facilitates cooperation in criminal 
activities (Gambetta, 2009). A related mechanism that increases the risk of recidivism is the use 
of prominent tattoos among prison gang members. These improve the operations of prison gangs 
by making it more difficult to participate in alternative, legitimate activities and act as a costly 
signal of the member’s dedication (Iannaconne 1992). This further diminishes the already limited 
probability of securing legal employment post release (Pager, Western, & Sugie, 2009), which is 
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an important hallmark of desistence. As a result, prison gang members engage in relatively more 
criminal activity and are therefore more likely to recidivate.  
A third way that prison gang membership leads to greater recidivism is by the response 
from the legal community. Law enforcement officials may pay greater attention to inmates 
identified as gang members once they are released. Law enforcement officials will be more 
likely to observe gang member’s post-release crimes, so prison gang members will be more 
likely to be rearrested or recommitted. The labeling perspective has explained how identities 
imposed by criminal justice authorities can produce negative outcomes, especially for those who 
are branded as being part of criminal organizations (Braithwaite, 1989; & Maruna, 2001). These 
external agents also include rival gang members who fail to realize that a given member has 
renounced his gang ties (Vigil, 2002). More recent theoretical innovations offered through 
developmental criminology have pointed to path dependence as being responsible for generating 
impediments to success as well (Piquero, Farrington, & Blumstein, 2007).   
The best developed body of research on the gang-membership recidivism connection has 
been generated from samples of formerly institutionalized juveniles. The results are split 
between those finding null-effects (Lattimore et al., 1995; Brownfield, Sorenson, & Thompson, 
2001) and those that find statistically significant variation between gang and non-gang members. 
The latter studies resulted from analyses of the records of 248 adolescents released from the 
Arkansas Division of Youth Services. Applying logistic regression techniques to the data and 
controlling for a variety of other factors reveal that gang members earned odds ratios slightly 
above 2 for recommitment one year following release (Benda & Tollett 1999; Tollett & Benda, 
1999) and were a little over four and a half times more likely to be rearrested as adults than those 
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not involved in a gang (Benda, Corwyn, & Toombs, 2001). It is unclear, however, if gang 
membership denoted street or institutionally oriented organizations.  
Two related literatures also examine the how gang membership affects offending while 
incarcerated and the relationship between in-custody offending and recidivism. It may be  that 
prison gang affiliation increases institutional misconduct and this, in turn, increases post-release 
misbehavior. An established body of work has argued that joining a prison gang increases prison 
misconduct (Ralph & Marquart 1991; Fong et al. 1992; DeLisi et al. 2004; Berk et al. 2006). 
This finding holds for inmates being chronically non-compliant and disruptive (Morris et al. 
2012), assaults on correctional staff (Sorensen et al. 2011); assault other inmates (Huebner 
2003). This is also found among  juvenile gang identified detainees engaging in institutionally 
dangerous  conduct (Trulson, 2007). Prison gang affiliation is also associated with elevated rates 
of in-prison violence even when controlling for a number of measures associated with overall 
predisposition toward violence (Gaes et al. 2002; Griffin & Hepburn 2006).  
The second body of work identifies a relationship between misbehavior while 
incarcerated and recidivism. Trulson et al. (2005) follow-up on more than 2,000 adjudicated 
delinquents released from the California Youth Authority (CYA) and find that those releases 
with more infractions while detained had significantly higher odds of rearrest for a felony 
offense. Another study of CYA releasees also finds a connection between gang-related activity, 
institutional violence, and overall rearrest postrelease (Lattimore et al. 2004; see also, Trulson et 
al. 2011).  Lastly, Huebner and co-authors (2007) find that the timing of postrelease reconviction 
is also correlated with institutional misconduct; those with higher scores are reconvicted sooner.   
Prior analysis of the dataset used in this study found that prison gang members do differ 
from non-gang members in the number of criminogenic traits they carry. When controlling for 
10 
 
age, race, education, and criminal history the effect of gang membership is reduced to 
insignificance in a logistic model (Olson, Dooley, & Kane, 2004).  
 
Data, sample, and measures 
The sample is comprised of all releasees from prisons operated by the Illinois Department 
of Corrections (IDOC) during the month of November 2000. (Further detail on the methodology 
can be found in Olson et al., 2004 and Olson & Dooley, 2006.) The IDOC research and analysis 
unit submitted all documentation relevant to each inmate to the research team. These data are 
enumerated below (Table 1). The data contains many of the key demographic and correctional 
items contained in the analysis: Age (in years), sex (0=female, 1=male), race (0=white, 1=black, 
2=Hispanic), marital status (0=common law/married, 1=separated/divorced, 2=single/widowed, 
3=missing), number of children, and educational attainment (0=high school diploma/GED, 1=no 
high school diploma/GED, 2=missing). These data were collected at reception and classification 
as the inmates were processed into the correctional system. The IDOC data also includes justice 
system data including the commitment offense type (0=missing, 1=person, 2=property, 3=drug, 
4=sex, 5=DUI, 7=other), time served (years), and the county type (0=rural, 1=urban, 2=Cook i.e. 
Chicago) to which they were being released. Additionally, these data include a measure of prison 
gang affiliation (0=no, 1=yes) that was assigned by gang intelligence units operating in the 
correctional system. Twenty-four percent of the sample was determined to be prison gang 
affiliated via an objective assessment of intelligence gathered by specially trained officers within 
the facilities. Those scoring high enough in terms of the point system established by the IDOC 
were flagged as being gang affiliated. These items could include, but were not limited to, the 
following pieces of evidence: self-admission, gang tattoos, keeping gang paraphernalia, and 
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developing or maintaining ties to known prison gang members. This finding is consistent with 
published national estimates of prison gang prevalence (Knox, 2000) of 25 percent (among 
males) and Illinois estimates of 26 (Corrections Compendium, 2000). A unique identifier, the 
state ID (SID) number, allows us to link these dependent variables with our outcome measures.       
 Approximately two years after the cohort was released, recidivism information was 
collected. The Illinois State Police records were matched on the SID allowing for arrest records 
to be merged with the IDOC master file. On January 6, 2003 arrest histories giving both pre-
incarceration arrest (number of priors) and rearrest were added. A few days prior, December 31, 
2002 a search of the Offender Tracking System maintained by the IDOC indicated which of the 
November 2000 releasee cohort had been readmitted to prison (return). These returns resulted 
from either a technical violation of the terms of mandatory supervised release and/or rearrest for 
a new offense. The available evidence on recidivism finds that most of the failure that occurs is 
likely to occur well within the roughly 750 day follow-up period used here. For the overall 
sample two-thirds (66 percent) were rearrested and just under half (48 percent) reincarcerated 
post release. These numbers are consistent with past research on recidivism  
Due to there being little, if any, reason to suspect seasonality of releasee type, the sample 
can be safely assumed to be representative, granting the work a reasonable claim to 
generalizability. There are two additional reasons why this data and its being set within Illinois 
are ideal conditions for examining the prison gang/recidivism relationship writ large. First, the 
state prison system is the seventh largest in the country (West et al., 2010). If the prison gang 
statistic is applied to the approximate population of the state prison system (42,000) this yields 
an estimate of slightly more than 10,000 inmates who are currently prison gang affiliated. This 
provides the researcher with a sufficiently large sample on which to conduct relatively 
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sophisticated statistical analyses. Secondly, the state has one of the most entrenched prison gang 
populations of any state penal system (Jacobs, 1977; Camp & Camp, 1985).  
 
Methods 
A large literature explores the issues that arise in establishing causal relationships with 
observational data (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009).  Regression analysis is typically performed in 
this context; however, in recent years researchers have increasingly begun to use matching 
algorithms to uncover causal relationships (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009).     
Matching is most commonly used in the program evaluation literature in which the 
researcher is concerned with estimating a “treatment effect.”  Estimation of program effects on 
outcomes is made difficult by the fact that program participants are not always selected at 
random, so unobserved variables can bias estimates of program effects.  When evaluating a job-
training program’s effect on wages, for example, one must be concerned that unobservable 
variables, such as “work ethic,” are correlated with participating in the program and wages.  If 
“work ethic” positively affects wages and people with greater “work ethic” are more likely to 
participate in job training then the effect of job training on wages will be overstated in a standard 
regression analysis.  Because individuals self-select (at least to some degree) into prison gangs, 
standard regression analysis will also generate biased estimates of the effect of prison-gang 
membership on recidivism. 
The general idea of matching algorithms is to mitigate the effect of confounding, pre-
treatment factors on estimates of treatment effects by balancing the covariate distributions of 
treatment and control groups.  For example, exact matching—matching at least one treatment 
unit with one or more control units with the same covariate values—would perfectly balance the 
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data and the treatment effect on the treated can be calculated non-parametrically with a simple 
difference in means.  However, when the data do not permit exact matching, such as when 
continuous variables are present, the researcher must resort to approximate matching techniques, 
such as propensity score matching, that are often cumbersome to implement (Iacus, King, & 
Porro, 2011). Additionally, the approximate matching techniques from the literature are designed 
to improve (and only report on) the mean imbalance between treatment and control groups, 
without addressing imbalance in higher-order moments. In this paper, we suggest that Coarsened 
Exact Matching (CEM), an easy to use and understand matching methodology developed by 
Iacus, King, and Porro (2011), can productively contribute to the criminology literature.  
Identifying Assumptions for Estimating the Counter-Factual of Interest 
We are interested in the impact of prison-gang membership (the treatment) on recidivism and 
re-arrest.  Assume there are two potential outcomes for any post-release offender.5  Let Ti = 1 for 
the ith ex-convict who enters a prison gang and Ti = 0 for the person who does not join a gang. 
Let Yi(1) represent the outcome (i.e. recidivism or rearrest) when Ti = 1 and Yi(0) represent the 
outcome when Ti = 0.  The true treatment effect for any individual is the difference between 
Yi(1) and Yi(0).  However, we cannot observe an ex-convict who is both a gang and non-gang 
member simultaneously.  What is actually observed in the data is Yi = Yi (Ti) = Yi(1) Ti + (1- 
Ti)Yi(0).  As a result, we must rely on assumptions concerning the counterfactual outcome—Yi(0) 
with treatment.  The problem of establishing a credible counterfactual is a missing data problem.  
Our objective is to estimate (some parameter of) the unobserved joint distribution 
F(Y(1),Y(0)|T=1).  The most common parameter of interest is the mean effect of treatment on the 
treated: ATT = E(Y(1)-Y(0)|T=1).               
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Matching algorithms typically assume covariates, X, can be drawn from the population to 
correct problems of pre-treatment differences across treatment and control groups.  Two more 
precise assumptions of matching follow: 1) unconfoundedness—after conditioning on a proper 
set of covariates there is no unobserved variable that affects both the potential outcome and the 
treatment assignment probabilities—formally defined as 𝑇∐(𝑌(1),𝑌(0))|𝑋), and 2) covariate 
overlap—for all values of the pre-treatment covariates there are treatment and control 
observations (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009).6  Assumption (2) implies that 0 < Pr(𝑇 = 1|𝑋) <1 .  In other words, the researcher’s objective is to create a sample of treatment and control units 
matched on observables in which any statistically significant difference in observed outcomes is 
attributable to treatment.    
Assumption (1) is the most controversial and difficult to establish (Imbens & Wooldridge, 
2009).  When the data are not generated by a controlled experiment, controlling for pre-treatment 
covariates with random assignment of treatment satisfies the unconfoundedness assumption (see 
Angrist and Pischke 2009).  However, given the non-random assignment of treatment in most 
cases in the literature, the reliance on assumption (1) is precarious and matching on observables 
is not a perfect substitute for an experimental design which controls for the effects of 
unobservables as they are related to treatment (see Angrist & Pischke, 2009).  Nonetheless, 
unconfoundedness can be justified on theoretical grounds (Imbens, 2004; Heckman, LaLonde, & 
Smith , 2000). Unconfoundedness may not be violated if individuals select treatment for 
unobserved reasons independent of the researcher’s outcome of interest (Heckman, LaLonde, & 
Smith , 2000).  If the prisoner’s expectation of post-release outcome(s) is independent of the 
decision to join a prison gang, then the selection-on-observables assumption is justified.  For 
example, a prisoner may sort into a prison gang for safety concerns, which may be generated 
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randomly, while in prison.  Such a situation could arise, if for example, prisoners with the same 
values for pre-treatment covariates are randomly assigned sets of strategies (e.g., because of 
initial contacts with other prisoners upon arrival) for dealing with prisoner-on-prisoner violence.  
Consequently, two prisoners could have the exact same pre-treatment covariates and objective 
(i.e. to improve their safety during a prison commitment) with one selecting into a prison gang 
for unobserved reasons (i.e. it was the best available survival strategy) and unconfoundedness 
not be violated.  However, if those prisoners who choose prison gang membership base their 
choice on a previous decision to become a hardened criminal, then unconfoundedness is violated 
and the estimate of prison-gang membership on post-release outcomes will be biased.  
Additionally, if one or more of the variables used to match treatment and control units is caused 
by selection into prison gangs then not only will unconfoundedness fail but the estimation bias 
can actually increase (Heckman, LaLonde, & Smith , 2000).  We avoid this last problem by 
exploiting the timing of the treatment with pre-treatment characteristics and then control for 
post-treatment observables in regression models.  It is also important to point out that matching 
algorithms can also reduce bias by decreasing dependence on functional form assumptions 
because observations are matched non-parametrically (Iacus, King, & Porro).   
Coarsened Exact Matching 
We introduce Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) to the criminology literature.7  CEM 
provides a potentially superior alternative to the more often used propensity score matching 
(PSM) because the latter only addresses mean imbalances (Iaucs, King, & Porro, 2011).  This 
can be a major problem if the data on covariates are drawn from distributions which are not well 
behaved across treatment and control units, in which case minimizing only mean-imbalance 
could be problematic (Iaucs, King, & Porro, 2011).  Another common problem with propensity 
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score matching is that to improve the balance between treatment and control groups on one 
covariate, balance often decreases in others (Iacus, King, & Porro).   
This last issue is a result of a methodological difference between CEM and PSM: with CEM 
the level of covariate balance is pre-determined by setting “tuning parameters” for each covariate 
which subsequently determines the sample size, whereas PSM sets the sample size ex ante by 
specifying the number of control units per treatment unit and balance is determined ex post 
(Iaucs, King, & Porro, 2011).  In CEM, the “tuning parameters” bound the imbalance on any 
single covariate but do not affect the imbalance on any of the other covariates (Iaucs, King, & 
Porro, 2011).  Because CEM limits each covariate by only one tuning parameter, balance in 
means and higher moments, as well as the full multivariate distribution can be improved (Iaucs, 
King, & Porro, 2011).  In the case of CEM, the tuning parameters are used to determine the level 
of coarsening of the data.  For example, one can think of “tuning parameters” as setting the 
tolerance level for grouping members by age.  If the researcher is studying small children, the 
tolerance (age range) would not be as high as if the entire adult population was the object of 
study.  
The general idea of CEM is to temporarily coarsen the covariates into bins, which can be 
defined by the user or generated automatically via the binning algorithms developed by 
(Blackwell, Iacus, King, & Porro, 2009). Exact matching is used to group treatment and control 
units.  The covariates are then returned to their original values and any group without at least one 
treatment and control unit is dropped.  As a result, both treatment and control units are pruned 
from the sample.  Trimming treatment and control units also reduces model dependence in 
estimates of the treatment effect by not “forcing” unreasonable matches for treatment units 
(Iacus, King, & Porro, forthcoming).  Additionally, CEM has a variety of other desirable 
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statistical properties.  For example, CEM has also been shown to bound the estimation error on 
the average treatment effect and is computationally efficient (Iacus, King, & Porro).   
 
Results 
In Table 1, the variable definitions, means (standard deviations), and logit estimates for re-
arrest and recidivism. According to the logit models, prison-gang membership increases the 
probability of both re-arrest and recidivism by about five-percentage points, but it is barely 
statistically significant at conventional levels.8   
Table 2 shows the multivariate and univariate imbalance between the control and treatment 
group with a statistic developed by Iaucs, King, & Porro (2011).  See the technical appendix for 
an explanation of how this statistic is formed.  The multivariate L1 statistic reported at the top of 
Table 2 indicates approximately 38 percent of the density for the treatment and control groups 
overlap. Given the relatively low level of overlap, the estimates from Table 1 of gang are heavily 
model dependent.  An important point about the multivariate L1 statistic is that it is of use 
primarily for comparing across different models, just as R-square is used in regular regression 
analysis (Iacus, King, & Porro, forthcoming).  Table 2 also reports univariate balance for the 
joint distribution of each covariate, as well as for the means and quantiles of the univariate 
distributions. We can see for example that the variable priors has better balance in the full joint 
distribution than in the means and also is not well balanced in the quantiles.  Table 3 shows the 
imbalance after applying CEM to the data set.9  Multivariate balance improved substantially as 
58 percent of the density for the treatment and control group overlap in the matched sample.  
Also, univariate balance improved for each covariate.  Mean imbalance actually increased for 
priors, however, balance in the quantiles improved significantly. 
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Table 4 shows the results from logit models for the estimate of prison-gang membership on 
recidivism and re-arrest.  For the matched samples, the regressions are weighted with importance 
weights generated from the CEM procedure (Blackwell, Iacus, King, & Porro, 2009).10  Without 
adjusting for covariates, the positive effect of gang on recidivism and re-arrest for the unmatched 
sample is quite large—approximately 13 and 10 percentage points, respectively—and 
statistically significant.  However, after balancing, the effect diminishes to approximately 7 and 6 
percentage points, respectively.  We also adjust the estimates by including the post-treatment 
covariates left out of the first-stage CEM procedure.  The effects are similar to those found for 
gang in Table 1, approximately 6 percentage point increase for both recidivism and re-arrest; 
however, the coefficients are more precisely estimated.  
We also estimated the same models using propensity score matching along with regression 
analysis11.  Using propensity score matching we found that the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
of gang membership on recidivism was 0.09 (nine percentage point increase in the probability of 
recidivism) and the (ATE) of gang membership on re-arrest was 0.10 (ten percentage point 
increase in the probability of recidivism) and both estimates are statistically significant at the five 
and one percent confidence levels, respectively.  Additionally, we estimated the Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), which is the goal of CEM, and prison gang membership 
had statistically significant increase in the probability of both recidivism and re-arrest of eight 
percentage points.   
 
Discussion and conclusion 
We examine the effect of prison gang membership on the risk of recidivism from a 
sample of released inmates from the Illinois penal system. The prison gang selection problem is 
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analyzed in a potential outcomes framework which allows us to postulate the conditions under 
which an average treatment effect of gang membership on recidivism can be estimated.  We then 
use Coarsened Exact Matching, a matching algorithm that has several advantages over the more 
popular propensity score matching, to balance the gang and non-gang groups on observables. 
Our results suggest prison gang membership increases recidivism by approximately six 
percentage points, which when evaluated at the sample means is a quantitatively large effect.  
The literature addressing street gangs has been a mainstay of research since Thrasher’s 
classic 1927 work. Alternatively, the discussion on how prison gangs relate to their street 
counterparts/compatriots has only recently been undertaken (Fleisher & Decker, 2001a; Decker, 
2007; Griffin, 2007). One recent study seeks to dissaggregate the relationship between gangs, 
guns, and drugs and recidivism (Huebner et al., 2007). The analysis identified street gang 
membership of a cohort of prison releasees as a significant contributor to reconviction. Echoing 
recommendations offered by others (Fleisher & Decker, 2001b), the authors advocate for 
additional resources to be dedicated to prison programming and improving the prison-
community transition after release (Huebner et al., 2007). These recommendations should be 
augmented with additional research to further specify how prison gang membership interacts 
with both street gang membership as well as the traditional hallmarks of post-release failure.   
All of those in our sample who were deemed by IDOC officials as participating in prison 
gang activity were identified at reception and classification as street gang members. Therefore, 
our results have clear implications for the importation model (Irwin & Cressey, 1962). The 
literature establishing the connection between street gang involvment and recidivism is 
estabilshed enough not to require further elaboration, and the paper cannot speak directly to this 
point. However, the connection between in-prison misconduct and subsequent misconduct being 
20 
 
linked to prison gang identification supports an emerging thesis merging life-course criminology 
(Laub & Sampson, 2003) with the importation model. The “life-course importation” model 
(DeLisi et al. 2011) invites reflection on how prison authorities should attempt to develop the 
prison experience as a turning point toward confomity, as opposed to repeat offending.  
Our test is less than definitive however, given the limitations of the data. One of the 
strengths of the data—its origins in a chronic gang state—may simultaneously cause estimation 
bias because of unobserved heterogenity in the prison gang members. There may be substantial 
differences among those classified as gang members. Consequently, these findings should be 
interpreted with caution by those interested in crafting effective policy solutions. Yet, following 
this line of reasoning, we would argue that an experimental design, if it were possible to 
implement some sort of random assignment mechanism, would not deliver the information  to 
help us understand the relationship between post-release outcomes and prison-gang membership 
(see Heckman, 2005).  That is, the mechanisms which assign treatment are often crude 
constructions that do not allow the researcher to identify the channels through which “causes” 
determine “effects.”  Additionally, random assignment by itself can only aid us in estimating the 
local treatment effect and cannot provide information on what might happen if treatment were 
assigned to agents in a different environment (see Heckman, 2005).        
However, we do see an opportunity for ethnographic data to bridge the gap in our 
understanding of gang-member selection and later outcomes.  This recommendation affirms that 
of at least one gang scholar (McGloin, 2007) who promotes the idea that processual (e.g. Short & 
Strotdbeck, 1965) issues are integral to deepening our understanding at the micro level. 
Ethnographers uncover first-order correlations which would not necessarily be observed in 
survey or experimental data because participant-observers are privy to the data generating 
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process as it happens in real time. However, the unique, restrictive nature of prison gangs makes 
ethnographic research more difficult than in other instances, such as street gangs (Venkatesh, 
1997; 2006). Past qualitative studies of prison life and prison social organization come from 
former inmates (Irwin 1970; 1980), academics serving as correctional officers and staff 
(Clemmer, 1940; Sykes, 1958; Carroll 1974; DiIulio, 1987; Fleisher, 1989), and even from non-
academic correctional officers (Morrill, 2005; Morales, 2008). One sociologist has recently 
lamented the fact that detailed studies of “the everyday world of inmates in America have gone 
into eclipse just when they were most needed on both scientific and political grounds” 
(Wacquant, 2002: 371; also Simon, 2000). In this context, ethnographic data are crucial because 
the process of gang-member selection likely has important subtelties which could be captured 
and incorporated into an improved survey design. As our potential outcomes framework makes 
clear, a rich set of pre-treatment covariates which accurately describe the selection process would 
allow us to obtain credible estimates of gang-membership on recidivism. Hence, closer 
cooperation between ethnographers and analytical researchers could greatly improve our 
understanding of the prison experience and its later effects.             
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1The potential outcomes framework is attributed Donald Rubin and is often referred to as the Rubin Causal Model in 
the statistics and econometrics literature.  See Holland (1986). 
2 On the definition of prison gangs, see also Lyman (1989) and Pyrooz et al (2011).  
3 There has also been must less work and progress on identifying the key aspects of prison gangs (Pyrooz et al 2011, 
16). 
4 This relates to the development and importation of inmate norms, see Hunt, Riegel, Morales, and Waldorf (1993). 
5 The potential outcomes approach is common to the program evaluation literature.  In the following discussion of 
the potential outcomes framework, we rely on previous discussions by Holland (1986), Todd (2008),  Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2009), and Angrist & Pischke (2009). 
6 Other terms for unconfoundedness include the following: selection on observables, exogeneity, and conditional 
independence.  We use these terms interchangeably with unconfoundedness in the text.  Covariate overlap is also 
synonymous with common support in the literature. 
7 CEM is a member of the Monotonic Imbalance Bounding class of matching algorithms (Iaucs, King, & Porro, 
2011).  Monotonic Imbalance Bounding differs from the Equal Percent Bias Reducing class of matching methods, 
which includes propensity-score matching (PSM), as Equal Percent Bias Reducing only addresses mean imbalance 
(Iaucs, King, & Porro, 2011). For the purpose of exposition, we compare CEM to PSM in this discussion in lieu of 
repeatedly referencing the class of estimators each belongs to, MIB and ECB, respectively. 
8 We also ran χ2 tests of independence for gang membership and recidivism/rearrest and were able to reject the null 
hypothesis at the 1 percent level in each case. 
9 Because most of the variables are binary and there is no obvious theoretical reasoning to manually coarsen priors,  
we use the automatic binning algorithm from (Blackwell, Iacus, King, & Porro, 2009). 
10 Importance weights are generated in STATA from the CEM procedure and they reflect the quality of the match 
between observations.  For an intuitive explanation of the weights, see 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xQwyLt_6EXdNpA685LjmhjO20y5pZDZYwe2qeNoI5dE/edit 
11 An anonymous reviewer posed an important question regarding the preference for Coarsened Exact Matching over 
Propensity Score Matching. The query assumes more importance in light of the similar results produced. In reaction 
we offer the following reply in justifying a preference for the former technique: We agree with this critique in 
general and we do not advocate for the abolition of propensity score matching.  However, there are no behavioral 
assumptions associated with these matching algorithms—they are all at some level black-box routines that improve 
the efficiency of our estimates.  Coarsened Exact Matching is as close to exact matching as one can get when 




Technical appendix  
The imbalance statistic is calculated by first cross-tabulating pre-treatment covariates, X,  
from the treatment and control groups and sorting them into bins according to pre-determined 
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cutpoints (Iacus, King, & Porro, forthcoming). Let H(X1) be the set of values generated from the 
coarsening of continuous variable X1, with binary and categorical variables retaining their same 
values (Iacus, King, & Porro, forthcoming). A multi-dimensional histogram is created from the 
Cartesian product H(X)=H(X1)×…×H(Xk) (Iaucs, King, & Porro, 2011).  Let 𝑡𝑙1 … 𝑡𝑙𝑘  and 
𝑐𝑙1 … 𝑐𝑙𝑘 represent the relative frequency distributions for treatment and control groups, 
respectively, in k-dimensional space. Multivariate imbalance is then measured by the L1-
distance: 𝐿1(𝑡, 𝑐) =  12 ∑ �𝑡𝑙1…𝑙𝑘 − 𝑐𝑙1…𝑙𝑘�𝑙1…𝑙𝑘∈𝐻(𝑋)  (Iaucs, King, & Porro, 2011).  Conditional on 
the level of coarsening, 𝐿1 ∈ (0,1) gives the fraction of the covariate overlap for the treatment 
and control groups.  𝐿1 = 0 represents perfect (up to the level coarsening) multivariate balance 
and 𝐿1 = 1 would indicate perfect multivariate imbalance.   
TABLE 1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS, MEANS (STDEV), LOGIT ESTIMATES 
Variable  Definition Mean Logit re-arrest Logit return 
re-arrest =1 if re-arrested 0.660 
(0.474) 
X X 
    return =1 if return to prison 0.493 
(0.500) X X 
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 Notes: For conviction variables, the omitted category is a composite of D.U.I., Property Crime, and Other Crime.  Reported coefficients 
for logit models are marginal effects calculated at sample means for the covariates.  Standard errors are calculated using the delta 




TABLE 2: MULTIVARIATE AND UNIVARIATE IMBALANCE OF PRETREATMENT COVARIATES 
Multivariate L1 Distance: 0.617 
  Univariate L1 Distances 
       Variable L1 mean min 25% 50% 75% max 
priors 0.148 0.294 0 2 2 1 -12 
children 0.012 -0.012 0 0 0 0 0 
male 0.177 0.177 0 0 0 0 0 
dropout 0.134 0.134 0 0 0 0 0 
black 0.124 0.124 0 1 0 0 0 
hisp 0.076 0.076 0 0 0 0 0 
drugcrime 0.068 0.068 0 0 0 0 0 
sexcrime 0.030 -0.030 0 0 0 0 0 
personcrime 0.056 0.056 0 0 0 1 0 
married 0.038 -0.038 0 0 0 0 0 
divorce 0.107 -0.107 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes: Treatment and control groups are separated on the basis of prison-gang membership.  1630 observations are 

















TABLE 3: MULTIVARIATE AND UNIVARIATE IMBALANCE WITH THE MATCHED SAMPLE 
Multivariate L1 Distance: 0.420 
Univariate L1 Distances 
Variable L1 mean min 25% 50% 75% max 
priors 0.11913 0.72425 0 1 1 1 -1 
childre 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
male 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
dropout 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
black 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
hisp 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
drugcrime 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
sexcrime 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
personcrime 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
married 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
divorce 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes: Treatment and control groups are separated on the basis of prison-gang membership.  1131 observations are 



















Table 4: Estimates of Prison-Gang Affiliation on Recidivism and Rearrest 
 
Logit re-arrest Logit return 













 exage   -0.003** 
(0.002) 
  -0.002 
(0.002) 
 
    
act_time_sv   -0.020*** 
(0.005) 
  -0.009 
(0.006) 
 
    
city   0.094* 
(0.057) 
  0.106 
(0.066)  
    
chicago   0.133*** 
(0.053) 
  0.097 
(0.062) 
     observations 1630 1131 1124 1630 1131 1124 
Treatment 459 411 410 459 411 410 
Control 1171 720 714 1171 720 714 
Pseudo R-sq 0.0118 0.0047 0.0230 0.0058 0.0028 0.0068 
Notes: For conviction variables, the omitted category is a composite of D.U.I., Property Crime, 
and Other Crime.  Reported coefficients for logit models are marginal effects calculated at 
sample means for the covariates.  Standard errors are calculated using the delta method.  














                                                          
